

22 November 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR CIA MEMBER, USIB

SUBJECT : CCPC Study on Intelligence Activities Against
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

REFERENCE: USIB-D-64.7/2 (CCPC-D-18/72) TS-204206/72
and Special Appendix SC-09918/72

1. This is a briefing memorandum on subject CCPC study which is item #1 on the USIB agenda for 30 November 1972.

2. This study was undertaken as a result of a decision by the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control (CCINC) to "strengthen our international narcotics intelligence gathering capability." Following this decision, Mr. Egil Krogh, Executive Director of the CCINC, tasked the Intelligence Subcommittee of the CCINC Working Group with preparing a set of recommendations designed to achieve this objective. The Subcommittee was also asked to catalogue the Federal intelligence resources now devoted to the international drug problem. Considering that it did not have the capability to undertake this assignment, and, further, that the task more properly might be carried out within the intelligence community, the Intelligence Subcommittee asked if the CCPC could make the study. Accordingly, the DCI charged the CCPC with conducting a review of our foreign intelligence efforts against narcotics, with looking into various related problems (as set forth in paragraph I. A., page 1 of the study), and with making recommendations to improve our overall intelligence on illicit narcotics activities.

3. The report has been in preparation for a considerable period of time due to a number of factors, chief of which is of course the magnitude and scope of the problem itself, in addition to the reticence of BNDD and the Bureau of Customs in discussing their operations and problems and the shifting emphasis on the various

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aspects of national and international narcotics problems, such as the expansion of the Customs role in the narcotics field and the creation of the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence (ONNI). Additionally, as recommendations were drafted, various agencies implemented actions, requiring constant updating of the report. Further, coordination on the study was complicated by the numerous offices and components involved, both within and outside CIA.

4. The report describes the current state of knowledge of the production and flow of illicit narcotics (Section II, page 3), lists the major gaps and information needs (Section III, page 7), the major targets and target areas (Section IV, page 10) and the current collection capability of the various agencies who have a narcotics collection role (Section V, page 11). Because coordination is the single greatest problem, there is a section devoted to operational coordination (Section VI, page 26). The major problem areas are set forth in Section VII (page 29). Finally, the Committee arrives at twenty conclusions (Section VII, page 37) and makes a number of recommendations designed to improve the overall intelligence effort against narcotics (Section IX, page 40). A Special Annex discusses [redacted] to the narcotics problem and makes a recommendation concerning an examination of what further [redacted] may be required.

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5. With the exception of whatever reservations Mr. Sullivan may have (as discussed below), the only problem with the CCPC report has centered around Recommendation No. 18 and its accompanying footnote (page 42). The Committee has determined that a central mechanism independent of parochial and departmental interests and bias is needed to coordinate the foreign intelligence aspects of the narcotics problem. It was the strong conviction of the CCPC Working Group which drafted the report that a foreign narcotics intelligence committee should be established and should be under USIB aegis. (Incidentally, the CCPC Working Group included several members of the CCINC Intelligence Subcommittee.) You will note, however, that this recommendation was not adopted by the CCPC, due to the existence of the CCINC Intelligence Subcommittee. Instead, a recommendation was made that the CCPC continue to monitor foreign intelligence aspects of the problem and report to the USIB.

6. This study was originally scheduled for USIB discussion on 16 November 1972 but was postponed at the request of Mr. William Sullivan, Director of the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence (ONNI). In his memorandum to the DCI requesting this postponement, Mr. Sullivan stated that a copy of the report was not made available to his office until 10 November 1972 and that ONNI was not requested to comment on the report or its conclusions or recommendations. He also noted "that the report deals substantially with ONNI and its mission," and that "there appear to be some inconsistencies with the role established for ONNI by Executive Order 11676 and other Presidential statements and envisioned for ONNI by the Attorney General." In this connection you should know that on 11 September Mr. Sullivan requested that Mr. Daniel McAuliffe of his office be allowed to participate "as an observer" in CCPC Working Group sessions. Mr. McAuliffe attended several meetings including the one in which the section describing ONNI's functions was drafted. He considered the statement "a very good one." Mr. McAuliffe has in his possession the next to the final draft of the report for which he signed a receipt on 13 September 1972. This draft contained conclusions and recommendations. Although notified of subsequent Working Group sessions Mr. McAuliffe did not participate in any after approximately 4 October 1972. Although Mr. Sullivan did not receive a formal USIB-distributed copy until 10 November, a copy of the final report (USIB-D-64.7/2 ((CCPC-D-18/72)) was made available to Mr. James Ludlum for Mr. Sullivan on 7 November 1972.

7. It cannot be said that the CCPC report "deals substantially with ONNI and its missions." There is a description of ONNI's function (page 27, 28) which was drawn from the Executive Order and from Mr. Sullivan's speech to the International Narcotics Conference which took place on 18 September 1972 at the State Department. (This is the mission statement which Mr. McAuliffe assisted in drafting.) ONNI is mentioned on page 36 in paragraph 3 in which the following statement is made:

ONNI, which has been established to provide a clearing house of drug intelligence for Federal, state and local agencies involved in the drug abuse problem was brought into being to solve this problem [providing a central repository or data base of

narcotics intelligence information], or at least part of it. However, the degree to which it may be able to do so, certainly within the near future, is unclear at this time in view of the magnitude of staffing and organizational problems involving the new office.

The other reference to ONNI is on page 39, Conclusion S in which the following statement is made:

The number and diversity of U. S. Government elements involved in narcotics information collection or law enforcement action abroad makes it exceptionally difficult for a clear picture to be formed at the national level of the overall U. S. intelligence effort against the narcotics target worldwide. While ONNI should over a period of time be able to fulfill this function with respect to domestic activities, it cannot and need not be expected to do so with respect to U. S. narcotics intelligence activities abroad.

8. Mr. Sullivan now appears to be objecting to statements which would limit his jurisdictional responsibilities to the United States and which would preclude his having access to data on sources as opposed to data on international traffickers and smugglers. On 26 September Mr. Sullivan circulated throughout the community, including to BNDD and Customs, his draft mission statement on which he requested comments of the recipients. The subsequent exchange of correspondence between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] reveals the trend of Mr. Sullivan's thinking concerning the scope of ONNI activities. In responding to Mr. [REDACTED] suggested changes in the ONNI mission statement Mr. Sullivan stated that "ONNI will operate according to the principles established for it by the President." The first principle is as found in Executive Order 11676 (to establish a National Narcotics Intelligence System). He added that the second principle contained in the appropriation request which the President transmitted to Congress is that ONNI

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"is to coordinate the determination of narcotics intelligence requirements and collection, analysis and dissemination of narcotics intelligence from both overseas and domestic sources." Mr. Sullivan also stated that he would be "hesitant to include in his mission statement an absolute declaration which could be interpreted as eschewing his right to be informed of sources and methods, in a context which would insure their continued protection." In another letter to Mr. [redacted] of 10 November 1972 Mr. Sullivan requested "a description of the assets available for targeting and gathering narcotics intelligence." Presumably the comments which Mr. Sullivan has said that he will furnish for the USIB meeting will be along the above lines.

9. The Deputy Director for Plans particularly wishes to avoid any development which could result in the Clandestine Service's having to reveal to ONNI, mandatorily, its sources and methods. The DCI's statutory responsibilities for protection of sources and methods cannot be amended or modified merely on the basis of ONNI's conceptions of its duties.

10. The CCPC's Study on Intelligence Activities Against Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has been concurred in by all USIB member agencies and departments as well as by the Bureau of Customs and BNDD. Your support for USIB approval of the Study's Conclusions and Recommendations at the 30 November 1972 USIB meeting is recommended.

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CIA Member
Critical Collection Problems Committee